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Abstract  
Belying the IMF’s reputation as a bastion of neo-liberal policy orthodoxy, this article 
analyses important yet contingent transformations in IMF fiscal policy thinking which 
constituted a key intervention in international austerity debates. Applying only to advanced 
economies, and in the specific post-crash conditions, the Fund came to champion fiscal 
policy as a more potent and effective counter-cyclical tool. Analysis focuses on alterations to 
modelling assumptions and analytical techniques, beginning before the crash but accelerating 
after it, which intellectually bolstered this view. It finds the Fund’s rediscovery of some older 
(Keynesian) assumptions was both longer in germination and more enduring than some have 
recognised. It also charts the reconciliation of this contingent Keynesianism to ‘congenital’ 
IMF concerns for fiscal sustainability. It highlights the variety of economic insights, often 
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with vastly differing policy implications, found within the Fund, and indeed within 
mainstream macroeconomics. It builds on work questioning the stability, consistency and 
coherence of economic ideas suggested by the paradigm framework, and identifies limitations 
of a paradigm lens for understanding incremental IMF ideational change. It contributes to 
politics of economic ideas scholarship in highlighting the importance of economic method 
and modelling assumptions as sites of contestation within gradual but meaningful ideational 
change.  
Key words: IMF; economic ideas; global financial crisis; austerity; fiscal policy; economic 
modelling; Keynesianism; neo-liberalism; paradigm  
Introduction  
The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and its aftermath reopened long-dormant debates, 
primarily in policy circles, over the conduct and efficacy of fiscal policy when faced with a 
deep recession and a financial crisis. The IMF’s propagation and dissemination of its 
prescriptive policy discourse was central to this, and this analysis drills down into how 
modest but significant ideational change plays out within the Fund’s interpretive framework. 
It finds that the IMF’s ‘mea culpa’ moment in October 2012 where it recognised that fiscal 
multipliers were higher than the Fund had previously acknowledged, especially in a recession 
(IMF 2012: 43; Blanchard & Leigh 2013) was part of a longer process of re-evaluation of 
fiscal policy models and assumptions – tracing its roots back before the GFC. The Fund’s 
rehabilitation of countercyclical fiscal policy as an economic stabilisation and crisis 
management tool was an important intervention within the acrimonious and drawn-out 
debates over the politics of austerity. The IMF, through its research on fiscal policy effects, 
became imbricated in the rethink of economic orthodoxy regarding post-crash 
macroeconomic policies (Clift 2018a). Revised Fund views of fiscal policy efficacy under the 
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specific GFC conditions facing the advanced economies ‘played onside’ less hawkish fiscal 
policy recommendations – yet crucially this policy advice was contingent, and only applied to 
advanced economies enjoying ‘fiscal space’ (not facing financing constraints).  
This article complements, but is distinct from, the analysis presented in my recent book (Clift 
2018a). The analytical focus and explanatory framework of this article are not the same as 
those developed in the book. This analysis zeroes in on how method and technique are key 
sites of contestation in a battle of economic ideas, charting the alterations of Fund analytical 
techniques underpinning fiscal policy analysis. Its focus is on how fresh insights are arrived 
at and substantiated using particular analytical techniques – processes crucial to 
understanding gradual but meaningful IMF ideational change. To map the landscape on 
which these discussions are conducted, we focus on two concepts in macroeconomics that 
capture the essence of the fiscal policy debate – crowding out and fiscal multipliers, as a 
precursor to exploring how the Fund approached and applied these concepts both before and 
after the GFC.  
Crowding out assumes that government expenditure does more harm than good, impeding 
inherently more efficient private sector activity. Fiscal multipliers gauge the effects of fiscal 
policy on output, with high multiplier values indicating a significant beneficial effect of 
expansionary fiscal policy on economic activity.  These apparently arcane, technical topics 
are in fact revealing of crucially important underlying principles of political economy, 
redolent of disputes between Keynesians and neo-classical economists about the appropriate 
role of the state. These long-debated ideas offer different visions of which economic policy 
levers governments can pull, and to what effect, when faced with a collapse of demand and/or 
a prolonged downturn.  Although the Fund’s re-evaluation analysed here involved the 
technical recalibration of models, at root it was based on changing emphases vis-à-vis a 
priori normative assumptions about fiscal policy. 
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The significance and contribution of this article is fourfold. Firstly, the analysis contributes to 
the specific literature on the Fund and its evolving economic ideas, revealing the limitations 
of broad-brush characterisations such as the IMF as a ‘neoliberal’ institution (see e.g. Nelson 
2014, 2017; Mueller 2011; Hernandez 2019). Such a characterisation tends to overlook 
significant ideational evolution. Furthermore it fails to appreciate varieties of economic 
insights, often with vastly differing policy implications and corollaries, which can be found 
within the relatively broad church of ‘mainstream’ macroeconomics, especially since the 
crash. We look beyond the ‘neoliberal’ label to unearth disputes, disagreements and 
divergences within conventional mainstream economics. 
Nelson’s analysis, albeit focused on the period 1980-2000, sees neoliberal economic ideas as 
integral to the IMF’s organizational culture – entailing commitments to tight fiscal and 
monetary discipline and the free play of market forces, and built on rational expectations 
(2017: 5, 7-8). This is evidenced through the training of most IMF economists at ‘a handful 
of highly ranked American economics departments that serve as incubators for neoliberal 
ideas’ (Nelson 2014: 309). Yet Nelson presents a somewhat static and undifferentiated 
account of ‘neoliberal’ economic ideas, which may understate important different strands of 
economic thinking and evolutions in economic ideas which are the focus of this article. 
Nelson offers an example of what Grabel calls the ‘continuity thesis’ which sees that little has 
really changed at the Fund (2017: 87; see also Vernengo & Ford 2014). Such a view masks 
the heterogeneity and capacity for innovation revealed in this analysis. 
An alternative version of the ‘continuity thesis’ comes from Mark Blyth, who argued that the 
Fund had a lightning switch to Keynesian ideas, but that ‘the global return of Keynes was to 
last only a year from start to finish’ (2013a 54-6). The Fund supposedly ‘reverted to type’ and 
fell in lock step with the fiscal consolidation focus of the Toronto 2010 G20 (2013b: 206-
210; see also Vernengo & Ford 2014; Fiebiger & Lavoie 2017). The story, this analysis 
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reveals, is more complicated and more interesting than that. As Blyth himself notes (2013a: 
212-5), research inspired by Keynesian ideas was developed ‘inside the IMF’ that critiqued 
the expansionary austerity thesis (2013a: 206). Blyth concludes that the IMF had ‘lost faith 
with austerity’ (2013a: 216). The Fund’s research arm was by no means reproducing the old 
orthodoxies about fiscal policy and austerity that Blyth elsewhere implies characterised the 
IMF from 2010 onwards (2013b: 210).  
As this suggests, there was a battle of ideas going on, in which the IMF was embroiled. 
Integral to this clash was the championing of opposing positions in the austerity debate by 
‘star’ economists such as Alesina and Blanchard as identified by Farrell and Quiggin (2017). 
They rightly draw our attention to ‘dynamics of prestige and status within the profession of 
economics’ and ‘struggles between different groups within economics’ (Farrell & Quggin 
2017: 269). A lot hinges on ‘factions within both economics profession and policymaking’ 
(Farrell & Quiggin 2017: 279) and the IMF represents, in their account, an important 
interface between the academia and economic policy-making and a key conduit of the 
Keynesian thinking, albeit only in the early post-crash period (Farrell & Quiggin 2017: 273-
4).  
For Farrell and Quiggin ‘ideas and politics were inextricably intertwined’ (2017: 280), with 
the IMF imbricated in this evolving economic policy debate, and our account aligns with 
them and indeed Blyth (2013 a&b) on this point. Yet the analysis here provides more depth 
and detail on IMF ideational evolution. It suggests a different temporality and assigns greater 
significance to the Keynesian revival at the Fund, both longer in germination and more 
enduring than Farrell and Quiggin or Blyth indicate.  
The nuances and differences in economic thinking central to this analysis of modest but 
significant IMF ideational change became more visible during and in the wake of the GFC. 
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Grabel identifies not a monolithic Fund, but rather ‘a dynamic layering process’ which ‘can 
sustain the myth of organizational cohesion in the face of division’ (Grabel 2017: 90). Her 
remarkable book highlights ‘subtle departures in IMF rhetoric and less subtle departures in 
IMF Research’ that highlight ‘tensions and ambiguities’ (2017: 125) in IMF economic 
thought. More broadly, macroeconomic thinking exhibited an ‘absence’ or ‘breakdown in the 
professional consensus’ about how to respond to the crisis (Grabel 2017: 90) 
This analysis aligns substantially with Grabel’s account, which highlights ‘internal policy 
debates’ as well as ‘tensions’ and ‘contradictions’ in IMF thinking (2017: 91). The ‘new 
rhetoric and research mark important breaks with the past that legitimize a concern for the 
poor and for the social costs of inequality and austerity’ (2017: 132), and amounts to a 
‘partial and inconsistent though meaningful change at the IMF’ (2017: 133). Grabel’s fresh 
insights into the Fund have pointed to a disjuncture between its research arm and operational 
side. This article shines the light on sinews which link the two – such as the amendments to 
the models which underpin some IMF operational work. Another example is the ‘bucket’ 
approach to assessing the size of fiscal multipliers, disseminated by the Fiscal Affairs 
Department to all IMF staff as a technical note to operationalize evolving IMF thinking about 
fiscal policy efficacy since the crash (Batini et al 2014). The meaningful change in research 
premises and findings may in time feed into practice through these and other mechanisms.  
 
The second contribution of this article concerns the dynamics of IMF ideational change, 
raising questions about how far a paradigm change framework enhances our understanding. It 
connects to insights advanced by others questioning the stability, consistency and coherence 
of thinking suggested by the paradigm framework (Carstensen & Matthijs 2018; Grabel 2017: 
ch 1; Clift 2018b, 2019). This analysis highlights scope for discursive struggles within 
mainstream economics and the importance of ‘intersubjectively held conventions regarding 
7 
 
“the way the world works” among a given community at a given moment’ (Blyth 2013b: 
200-3). Berman, for example, notes the importance of policy and political context and how 
‘political space’ opens up which different ideas can fill, through shocks, crisis, or through 
processes of gradual dissatisfaction, and disillusionment with prior ideas. Thereafter, 
‘political actors’, ‘carriers’ or ‘entrepreneurs’ work to ‘champion alternatives to the ideas 
being questioned and perhaps abandoned’ (2013: 227), with the fate of new thinking 
dependent partly on the ‘power positions’ of these actors.  
 
The article’s third contribution adds to politics of economic ideas accounts through its focus 
on economic methods and techniques, and the central assumptions of IMF modelling. Method 
gets neglected as the technical realm within which economic ideas, once established, are 
implemented. In fact, economic modelling assumptions constitute a site for the contestation 
of these ideas (on this see also Robles 2018; Yarrow 2018). The Fund’s methods and models 
retained a commitment to micro-foundations characteristic of the prevailing ‘dynamic 
stochastic general equilibrium’ (DSGE) modelling approach of mainstream economics. Yet 
IMF work altered the assumptions and insights feeding into its fiscal modelling in ways 
which departed from a New Classical or ‘Ricardian’ world view. Rather than constituting a 
methodological challenge to mainstream academic macroeconomics – IMF modellers and a 
number of others outside the Fund were pursuing an alternative strand of micro-founded 
DSGE modelling. The IMF’s fiscal modelling revisions before and after the crash 
incorporated the rediscovery of some older (Keynesian) assumptions about how the macro 
economy works.2 In addition, following the crash the IMF used non-linear, non-DSGE 
analytical techniques to gauge higher fiscal multipliers under recessionary and post-financial 
                                                          
2 For a discussion of the understandings of the economy underpinning Keynesian, New Keynesian and New 
Classical economics see Clift (2018a: 65-74). 
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crisis conditions. The IMF’s small modelling team and other IMF researchers re-thought the 
microfoundations of their models and analysis in a more Keynesian-compatible way. 
 
The analysis explores under-appreciated processes of translation from the underlying 
positions in the fiscal policy debate, and their assumptive foundations operating at a high 
level of abstraction and generality, to their operationalization through particular methods and 
economic models, and more concrete, policy-oriented concepts. The IMF is an avowedly 
technocratic institution, but in their operational work Fund economists deal in contrasting 
normatively informed accounts of how the economy and policy work – built in via the 
assumptive foundations of the various models they operate with. All this is significant for 
characterisation of the IMF’s political economy.  
 
The fourth contribution of this article is to the wider political economy literature on austerity 
and advanced economy responses to the GFC, analysing how IMF analysis and commentary 
feeds into, and opens up possibilities within, broader international economic policy debates. 
As the Great Recession drew on, an influential group of New Classical economists around 
Alesina, termed by Blyth the ‘Boccioni boys’ (2013a: 165-70), and by Krugman the 
‘austerians’ (2015), continued to embrace anti-Keynesian ‘expansionary fiscal contraction’ 
arguments, and crowding out views. Another group, which included IMF Chief Economist 
Blanchard as well as respected academics such as Auerbach, Summers, and De Long held 
Keynesian views about the increased potency of counter-cyclical fiscal policy in recessionary 
conditions –especially where monetary policy was constrained by the ‘zero lower bound’. 
The IMF was central to bolstering the respectability of the positive views of fiscal policy’s 
efficacy for a particular group of countries under specific conditions. Since 2008, the Fund 
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prescriptive economic policy discourse foregrounds the positive connection between public 
spending and activist fiscal policy on the one hand and economic growth on the other.  
 
Through analysis of working papers and other Fund publications laying bare the assumptive 
foundations and ‘modelling philosophy’ (Laxton 2008) at the IMF, it is possible to analyse 
how particular economic concepts are understood and deployed within the Fund’s modelling, 
and how this can change. Whilst IMF researchers undertook the Keynesian recalibrations of 
its DSGE models detailed in this article, the ‘bulk of the articles published in the top journals 
continued to work with orthodox rational expectations-based models designed as if there had 
been no crisis’ (Ban 2018: 2; Ban & Patenaude 2018). The IMF’s altered model assumptions 
and foundations matter because they reflect different ideological pre-suppositions about how 
efficient markets are, and how and in what way agents are rational. This can entail very 
different policy ramifications and corollaries. For example, the representative agent of the 
New Classical Macroeconomics tradition, assuming perfect information and forward-looking 
constant optimisation, generates a very different set of policy recommendations, as compared 
to the heterogeneous agent approach including significant proportions of cash strapped ‘hand-
to-mouth’ consumers and households. The latter increasingly came to underpin the IMF’s 
post-crash fiscal policy modelling.  
We find the IMF’s fiscal policy thinking is built on a somewhat anachronistic amalgam. It 
assumes the non-applicability of Ricardian Equivalence, and the possibility of elevated fiscal 
multipliers in short-term - something the Fund uses unconventional non-linear techniques to 
analyse. At the same time, the Fund anticipates long-term crowding out effects, and takes a 
relatively hard line on fiscal sustainability in the long run. The economic ideas built into the 
Fund’s standard operating procedures, and policy frameworks are drawn from different 
paradigmatic homes. Such a position can be difficult to capture within a paradigm framework 
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for understanding economic ideas and how they inform policy work.  Similar to Carstensen 
and Matthijs, this analysis is mindful not to present ideas as ideas as ‘too static’ and ‘too 
monolithic’, and alive to the flexibility and malleability of paradigms, and the importance of 
‘gradual ideational change within a paradigm’, and how ‘new ideational elements may be 
affixed’ to existing paradigms (Carstensen & Matthijs 2018: 432, 433). The shifts ‘in relative 
weight of ideas within the paradigm’ (2018: 435) identified by Carstensen and Matthijs form 
a focal point for our analysis. This account points to how this flexibility and malleability 
extends to incorporating ideas from different paradigmatic homes (see also Clift 2019). This 
article therefore stresses a repertoire of acceptable, respectable economic ideas ‘in play’ 
within the Fund, and policy-makers’ tendency to move between and within, and to recombine 
ideational frameworks depending in part on economic conjuncture, time horizon, and upon 
who is the recipient of the policy advice, amongst other factors. 
The next section explores the IMF’s economic ideas as deployed by ‘clinical’ economists in 
executing their operational remit, indicating the limits of a paradigm framing for 
understanding IMF ideational evolution. The following section sets out crowding out and 
fiscal multipliers, and how they are approached within the IMF in more detail. Thereafter, the 
analysis briefly charts the theoretical and methodological evolution of modern 
macroeconomics, highlighting important intellectual moves made in reshaping mainstream 
macroeconomics along ‘New Classical’ lines in the 1970s and 1980s. It focuses on the fiscal 
policy implications of the rise of DSGE modelling. The following sections delve into IMF 
thinking and modelling practice to reveal how some of these ‘New Classical’ assumptions 
were challenged in the 2000s as unrealistic and unhelpful for policy analysis. Since the crash, 
the assumptive foundations of Fund fiscal policy models were altered further. The alterations 
of technique and method reinforced the case for rehabilitating counter-cyclical fiscal policy 
as a stabilisation tool.  This all underpins the IMF’s ‘contingent Keynesian’ approach to 
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advanced economy fiscal policy recommendations developed since 2008, which finds some 
echoes in Mario Seccareccia’s ‘new fiscalism’ (2012).  
Yet it is important to appreciate the limits of the ideational shift charted here. For all the 
Fund’s nominal commitment to ‘even-handedness’ (IMF 2014a), the organization continues 
to approach fiscal issues differently for different kinds of countries. The content of the new 
thinking results both from the context of the crash, but also the fact that advanced economies 
were the ones primarily affected. The new analytical work by the Research department, 
indicating a more Keynesian disposition on fiscal policy, does not apply to all Fund members 
under all conditions. It is contingent – applying in the ‘zero lower bound’ economic context, 
but moreover to advanced economies, and only to those enjoying fiscal space (on this see 
Clift 2018a: 106-110). Thus the novel fiscal thinking pervades research, flagship 
publications, prescriptive discourse and some multilateral and bilateral surveillance, but it has 
not altered practice substantively where the Fund is dealing with countries lacking fiscal 
space, such as conditionality and programmes. There are, as Grabel points out, limits to how 
much coherence and consistency we should expect from a large complex bureaucratic 
international institution like the Fund (2017: chapter 5). 
Economic Ideas and the IMF’s ‘Clinical Economists’  
The paradigm view of how economic ideas underpin policy thinking, which is the default 
setting for many political scientists and political economists approaching these issues, sees a 
world of incommensurable economic ideas, and the embrace of one or rejection of the other 
in a Manichean struggle (see e.g. Hall 1993; Blyth 2002; Hay 2001). This familiar framing 
does not prove wholly persuasive in explaining the IMF ideational change detailed here. Our 
analysis finds limits to the stability, consistency and coherence of IMF thinking which jars 
with a paradigm framework. As well as flexibility and malleability of paradigms (Carstensen 
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& Matthijs 2018), we find evidence of ideas drawn from different paradigms being brought 
together (see also Clift 2019). In this our account follows Blyth in underlining the 
paradoxical difficulties paradigm thinking has dealing with combining supposedly 
incommensurable ideas (Blyth 2013b: 203-5, 211-3).  
IMF staff, especially in the wake of the GFC, see themselves as pragmatic ‘clinical 
economists’ who have to address pressing policy questions on a daily basis, ‘trying to figure 
out what we think is the right policy recommendation … We in essence approach policy 
recommendations from the standpoint of empiricism; of trying to figure out what makes 
sense in a given setting and make sure it’s right’.3 Fund economists’ self-image, then, is as 
non-doctrinaire and policy-oriented economists. This pragmatic self-image is not to be taken 
at face value. It underplays, for example, the IMF’s own Independent Evaluation 
Office findings of groupthink and intellectual capture in the pre-crash Fund (2011, 18-19). It 
can be criticised for overlooking how ideas about economic policy are always rooted in the 
principles of political economy, and are thus at some level inherently ideological. 
Nevertheless, it indicates Fund economists’ scope for anachronistic ‘inter-paradigm 
borrowing’ (Hay 2011), combining ideas from different paradigmatic homes into a pragmatic 
amalgam. This is difficult to reconcile to a standard paradigm framework. 
Fund economists are willing to engage with somewhat heterogeneous schools of economic 
thought, and indeed entertain multiple modes of thinking about the economy. Whilst some 
Fund policy thinking is closely linked to economic modelling, many Fund economists in 
interview characterised their operational work as more empirical and ‘atheoretical’. This 
distinction between theoretical and empirical work gives Fund economists licence, in 
approaching policy challenges, to adjust theoretical beliefs to fit with empirical contexts. IMF 
                                                          
3 Interview with IMF Deputy Director, David Lipton, June 2013 
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economists appear comfortable operating with different and even incompatible economic 
world-views depending on the policy issue and economic conjuncture. 
IMF working papers will often situate findings in relation to diametrically opposed 
theoretical positions within the repertoire of the IMF’s economic ideas – from traditional 
Keynesianism to the radically anti-Keynesian New Classical School (see e.g. Batini et al 
2012; Baum et al 2012) - and find some merit in each. Chwieroth’s study found ‘much more 
diversity of thought within the Fund than the conventional wisdom suggested’ (Chwieroth 
2010: xi; see also Ban 2015a&b), and that finding is reinforced here. The range of 
macroeconomic ideas IMF economists readily entertain all fall within the mainstream, but it 
extends across a repertoire which goes well beyond just New Classical ‘representative agent 
with rational expectations’ thinking. As detailed below, there is an openness to different 
analytical techniques and modelling assumptions.   
The Fund’s policy frameworks such as financial programming have been built up over many 
decades (see Polak 1957; de Vries 1987). The Fund’s operational work was founded on a 
bedrock of Keynesian understandings of the economy, and Fund policy frameworks have 
evolved since the 1940s and sedimented economic ideas from different  paradigmatic homes. 
IMF economists are influenced by the ebb and flow of the mainsteam macroeconomic 
orthodoxy, and the Fund incorporated new economic ideas from the 1980s onwards, as new 
recruits trained after the heyday of Keynesianism joined the organisation (Chwieroth 2008). 
Fund staff have found some evolutions in academic economics more useful than others for 
fulfilling their role as ‘clinical economists’. Due in part to the limits of their real world 
applicability, neither monetarism (Clift & Tomlinson 2012) nor some of the ideas of the New 
Classical School (Boughton 2004) wholly took hold within the organisation, such as the 
policy ineffectiveness proposition (see e.g. Hemming et al 2002a: 5). Nevertheless, numerous 
strands of neo-liberal economic thought were added to the spectrum of views within the Fund 
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(Chwieroth 2010). Hence talk of the IMF’s policy paradigm as a singular, coherent entity (see 
e.g. David 1985 ; Mueller 2011; Grabel 2003), whilst an understandable shorthand, can be 
somewhat misleading.  
Fund economists are more comfortable debating different methods and models than aligning 
with particular schools of economic thought, be it New Keynesian or New Classical. As Fund 
Deputy Director David Lipton put it, ‘I think Keynesianism is a label that helps people 
classify economists into different categories, but I think you would not find people here 
describing themselves with any of those labels.’4 This reluctance explains why the Fund’s 
internal struggle over fiscal policy ideas took place on the terrain of techniques and modelling 
assumptions. Focusing on such technical considerations side-steps the ideological character 
of economic discussion which jars with the Fund’s technocratic ‘clinical’ economist self-
image and credentials. IMF economists display a relative pluralism, within ‘New Consensus’ 
macroeconomics, willing to work with different economic models and analytical techniques, 
with different assumptions, structures and characteristics, to address a wide range of policy 
issues and conjunctures.  
Fund clinical economists’ flexibility should not be overstated. It operates within the 
parameters of a socially constructed and relatively limited range of acceptable or respectable 
economic ideas upon which the Fund is inclined to draw. This is shaped by ‘internal 
dynamics of prestige and status within the profession of economics’ (Farrell & Quiggin 2017: 
1). The Fund also prides itself, in the interests of sustaining its intellectual authority, on the 
consistency of its policy message. ‘Mea culpa’ moments where the Fund admits an error and 
changes its view, as over fiscal multipliers in 2012, are relatively rare. When pushed, many 
Fund interviewees reflected that they and the institution operates with a broadly Keynesian 
                                                          
4 Interview with Fund Deputy Director David Lipton. June 2013 
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working model – especially for short-term policy analysis. Some variant of the neo-classical 
synthesis continues to provide the centre of gravity of much Fund thinking. This was often 
acknowledged by insiders as a combination of ‘short-term Keynesian’ thinking and ‘long-
term neo-classical’ insights (see Chwieroth 2010: 72-9).  
This open-minded self-image finds expression in something of a mantra at the Fund ‘when 
the facts change, we are prepared to change’ (see e.g. Lagarde 2013). A stark example is 
provided by Carlo Cottarelli, Director of the Fiscal Affairs Department between 2008 and 
2014. Under the specific conditions which swiftly followed the 2008 crash, namely ‘a 
demand-deficiency recession. Lack of demand, abetted by uncertainty and rising 
unemployment, was driving output further and further down.’ , as Cottarelli et al. noted on 
the first page of their IMF volume Post-Crisis Fiscal Policy, ‘Keynes’ General Theory was 
the relevant textbook’ (Cottarelli et al. 2014: 1). In 2013, in light of the advanced economy 
policy context of the GFC and the Great Recession, Cottarelli confided that ‘there are no 
Ricardians at the Fund any more’. He tellingly added ‘I don’t know how long it will last, but 
for the moment ... it’s not that the world will never be Ricardian again, it’s that at the moment 
it is not.’5 The Ricardian and Keynesian views of the economy and fiscal policy are radically 
incommensurable, yet Fund staff are willing, it seems, take a theory of the economy off the 
peg when it looks likely to suit the policy conjuncture.   
In addition to shifting between insights drawn from different paradigmatic homes, IMF 
economists also always attach caveats to how they use or interpret the findings from 
theoretically informed econometric modelling.6 The practical expediencies of econometric 
modelling mean that assumptions underpinning IMF models are at times made out of 
convenience, and are not necessarily a reflection of pure beliefs (Chwieroth 2010: 43). The 
                                                          
5 Interview with former Fiscal Affairs Department Director Carlo Cottarelli, June 2013. 
6 Interview with IMF Modeller in Chief Doug Laxton September 2013 
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different models in play at the Fund, the caveats attached to each, and their coexistence 
alongside non-model based thinking underlines the point that ‘Fund thinking’ about the 
economy and economic policy is not fully reducible to the assumptions plugged into its 
econometric models. These are further reasons why paradigm thinking may be of limited use 
in interpreting IMF economic ideas.  
IMF models remain extremely valued tools within the Fund, not least because of its scientific 
norms prioritising linking IMF research to academic macroeconomics (Momani 2010: 45; 
Chwieroth 2010: 33). The IMF prizes respectability within the economics profession as one 
source of its scientific and intellectual authority. Hence the consistent efforts, detailed below, 
to revise models to limit their shortcomings for fiscal policy analysis – yet to do so in a way 
that remains faithful to the commitment to ‘firm’ micro-foundations characteristic of 
mainstream macroeconomics. The caveats attached to models are a recognition that economic 
policy thinking outside of formal modelling is a burgeoning necessity for an organisation like 
the IMF. Its ‘clinical economists’, after all, are faced with policy scenarios not always readily 
captured by this form of econometric modelling. 
 ‘Crowding Out’, Fiscal Multipliers and the Political Economy of Fiscal Policy  
Crowding out assumes that government expenditure does more harm than good, impeding 
inherently more efficient private sector activity. Fiscal multipliers assess the potency of fiscal 
policy, and higher values refer to the more positive knock on effects on economic activity, 
through consumption and other channels, of increased public expenditure. These two 
important economic insights, each of which can operate at varying levels of generality, 
capture a spectrum of macroeconomic views about fiscal policy. There are processes of 
translation from the underlying positions in the fiscal policy debate, and their assumptive 
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foundations operating at a high level of abstraction, to their operationalization through 
particular methods and economic models, and more concrete, policy-oriented concepts.  
The crowding out argument, a mainstay of the analysis of state/market relations, assumes 
increases in public spending will simply ‘crowd out’ (inherently more efficient) private 
consumption and investment. These arguments are built on ancillary assumptions about the 
efficiency of market mechanisms, for example Say’s Law; supply calls forth demand and 
markets tend inherently towards general equilibrium at full employment. Crowding out harks 
back to neo-classical economics, and specifically the UK ‘Treasury view’ of the 1920s and 
1930s which Keynes was railing against. Partial or full crowding out assumptions reinforce 
an aversion to government intervention in the economy generally, and activist fiscal policy 
specifically.  
One straightforward, context-specific, crowding out proposition is that government deficits 
resulting from fiscal expansion will require increased borrowing. This can raise interest rates 
– drawing funds towards government securities and away from more productive investments. 
Where fiscal expansion raises concerns about long-term fiscal sustainability, crowding out is 
exacerbated by the risk premia attached to government borrowing. A second dimension of 
crowding out is how fiscally conservative central banks committed to sound money respond 
to fiscal expansion by raising interest rates (see e.g. Arestis & Sawyer 2003: 8-9). 
Particularly salient for the fiscal policy debate, the ‘Ricardian equivalence’ of debt and 
taxation is another channel for crowding out, occurring through a fall in consumption (Barro 
1974; 1989). This prominent feature of the post-crash politics of austerity discussion brings 
the relationship to fiscal multipliers into focus. Ricardian equivalence, a position which, 
perhaps confusingly, David Ricardo did not agree with (see Quiggin 2012: 95-6), argues that 
rational, forward-looking actors alter consumption practices in anticipation of future rises in 
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taxation associated with debt-financed increased public expenditure. Economic agents thus 
offset the effects on aggregate demand of expansionary government fiscal policy; ‘the policy 
is totally frustrated, and the fiscal multiplier is zero’ (Arestis & Sawyer 2003: 12-13). 
Ricardian equivalence arguments, just like the 100% crowding out arguments that are their 
close cousins, presume no positive effects of expansionary fiscal policy. The fiscal multiplier 
value may even be negative. These interpretations are the anti-thesis of the classic Keynesian 
view that fiscal expansion can boost employment and output.  
The opposing, more Keynesian, view analyses fiscal policy in terms of positive fiscal 
multipliers, which gauge a beneficial effect on output of government fiscal activism (Keynes 
[1936]1964: 113-131; Backhouse 2006: 32). This recognition of the potentially beneficial 
effects of increased public spending and positive spillover effects of the aggregate demand 
boost on consumption, economic activity and confidence is important for the politics of fiscal 
policy. Once again it relies on ancillary assumptions, notably ‘the absence of some powerful 
automatic market forces’ ensuring ‘that the level of aggregate demand moves quickly to be 
consistent with the supply-side equilibrium’ (Arestis and Sawyer 2003: 12). Some recent 
studies suggest that, under certain conditions, for example in a recession, with a sizeable 
output gap and spare capacity in the economy, fiscal multipliers can be as high as 3 or even 5 
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Woodford 
2011).  
The Consensus in mainstream pre-crash macroeconomics viewed monetary policy as a more 
reliable and desirable tool for economic stabilisation than fiscal policy (Romer 2012; 
Blanchard et al 2010). As a result, the debate about fiscal policy efficacy was a sleepy 
backwater of macroeconomic theorising. That said, these starkly competing and conflicting 
interpretations of fiscal policy effects continue to find their advocates within 
macroeconomics, with no consensus emerging either empirically or theoretically. The IMF 
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takes a keen interest in theoretical evolutions and debates in academic macroeconomics. It is 
staffed by trained economists who were party to these debates, and many continue to publish 
in academic economics journals. These academic fiscal policy debates are vital context for 
the Fund’s own thinking and practice because of the importance the IMF attaches to situating 
its own economic policy analysis in relation to prevailing thinking in mainstream economics 
(see e.g. Chwieroth 2010: 33; Ban 2015a & b; Boughton 2004).  
 
The centre of gravity of the Fund’s pre-crisis fiscal policy thinking remained broadly within 
the consensual mainstream view that fiscal multipliers are modest but positive, likely around 
0.5, and probably less than 1. Multipliers varied according to countries’ economic openness, 
whether monetary policy was accommodating, exchange regime and so on (Hemming, Kell 
& Mahfouz 2002, Hemming et al 2002a&b; Heller 2002). IMF studies reviewed the existing 
body of knowledge on fiscal policy’s efficacy for advanced economies in the early 2000s, 
noting that, ‘despite Keynesian orthodoxy, fiscal policy is only marginally effective in 
countering economic downturns’ (Hemming et al. 2002b: 237). These studies include some 
recognition of the possibility that fiscal multipliers may be negative (Hemming et al 
2002a&b), although doubt was cast on the empirical substantiation for that view; ‘There is 
little evidence of direct crowding out or crowding out through interest rates and the exchange 
rate. Nor does full Ricardian equivalence or a significant partial Ricardian offset get much 
support from the evidence’ (Hemming et al 2002a: 5). On balance the Fund’s view was rather 
downbeat on both the Keynesian assessment of potent counter-cyclical fiscal policy, and on 
the New Classical assertion that fiscal policy is completely ineffective. 
 
Models, Assumptive Foundations, and Mainstream Economics 
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One crucially important level at which these fiscal debates are carried out is the technical 
discussion over which models, with which assumptions plugged into them, should be used to 
analyse macroeconomic policy questions. The way the IMF constructs its models and 
approaches method and technique issues mediate how these fiscal policy debates mattered for 
IMF policy thinking and practice. The Fund efforts to revise the premises of its models to 
make them more relevant for post-GFC policy analysis reflects, in part, the IMF’s role as 
‘clinical’ economists. Their operational remit sets them somewhat apart from academic 
economics, this distance rooted in differing modelling ambitions between academic and 
policy-oriented research (Blanchard 2018: 48; Ban & Patenaude 2018). As others have noted, 
traction over real-world policy issues is more important for policy economists in central 
banks or at the IMF than it is for academic career success (Ban 2018: 2-3; Thiemann 2018; 
Blyth 2013b: 209). 
Within academic economics in the 1970s and 1980s, what has been termed the New Classical 
Counter-Revolution (NCCR), launched an assault on prevailing structural econometric 
models (SEM)s, and their Keynesian underpinnings (Wren-Lewis 2016). New Classical 
Macroeconomics was profoundly unsatisfied with the lack of coherence between the 
assumptions of macroeconomics underpinning the neo-classical synthesis (imperfect markets 
containing wage and price rigidities), and microeconomics’ utility maximising, optimising 
and efficient understandings of how actors and market behave (see Skidelsky 2009: 104-9). 
This was at the core of the NCCR’s animating desire to provide rigorous ‘micro-foundations’ 
(incorporating forward-looking, constantly optimising agents) for macroeconomic theorising 
and analysis (Lucas 1976, Lucas and Sargent 1981).  
Central to the attack on how economics and modelling was being conducted was the ‘Lucas 
critique’, which pointed out methodological flaws of how Keynesian SEMs were used for 
policy analysis (Lucas 1976). These models sought to predict the effects of economic policy 
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on the basis of relationships observed using aggregate historical data. Key assumptions about 
behaviour - decision rules, such as the consumption function - treated as structural (and 
unchanging) aspects that would, in fact, be sensitive to alterations in policy. SEMs could 
therefore not capture how behaviours of individual economic actors would change in 
response to policy change. As Lucas & Sargent claimed starkly ‘without knowledge as to 
which structural parameters remain invariant as policy changes, and which change (and how), 
an econometric model is of no value in assessing alternative policies’ (1997 [1978]: 273). 
This logical problem constituted a rebuttal of all models not based on individual optimisation 
(the rigorous micro foundations which were the essence of the NCCR). 
After the Lucas critique, which reverberated widely in macroeconomics, it became a 
benchmark of methodological respectability, both in academia and policy institutions, to 
embrace the ‘firm’ micro-foundations agenda. New techniques emerged, notably DSGE 
modelling, based on predicting the behaviour of these rational agents. This seemed to offer 
the potential for a macroeconomics built on NCCR’s firm micro-foundations. Real Business 
Cycle (RBC) theory, which advanced a distinctly anti-Keynesian approach to explain 
business cycles (see Backhouse 2002: 298-301), was the first to use DSGE modelling 
(Blanchard 2018: 44; Helgadottir 2018). RBC used the very exacting New Classical 
understanding of constant optimising rational expectations to account for the peaks and 
troughs of the economic cycle. Whilst the plausibility of RBC’s account of business cycles 
was questionable (Wren-Lewis 2016; Eatwell & Milgate 2011: xvi), the methodological 
advances of DSGE, micro-founded on rational expectations gained widespread assent.  
The microfoundations move augured by Lucas and Sargent, and the trail blazed by RBC and 
its DSGE models, had deep and wide impacts on the economics profession (Blanchard 2018; 
Wren-Lewis 2018; Hendry & Muellbauer 2018; Helgadottir 2018). Whilst these lie beyond 
the ambit of this article, there are specific implications for the 21st Century fiscal policy 
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efficacy discussion, and the international economic policy debate. The innovative New 
Classical methods and techniques were not incorporated into macroeconomics in a way that 
was neutral regarding the principles of political economy themes that suffused the fiscal 
policy discussion. As Chwieroth notes, ‘even the most ostensibly positive models of 
economic behaviour are saturated with normative and ethical implications’ (Chwieroth 2010: 
42; see also Dow 2015; Best & Widmaier 2006). The prevailing approach to DSGE 
modelling is built on the heroic assumption of a single representative agent. The way New 
Classical Macroeconomics and its DSGE modelling approached both the specific 
characteristics of the ‘representative agent’, and the particular nature of their ‘rational 
expectations’ made a series of important intellectual moves to entrench a distinctive view of 
the economy. Assuming constantly optimising forward looking agents, possessed of complete 
and perfect information, fuels a conviction that market mechanisms and the private sector 
will allocate resources optimally. These a priori-presumed efficient functioning markets, in 
this vision of the economy, can and should be left to their own devices to steer the economy 
back to (full employment) equilibrium (see e.g. Quiggin 2012: 80-4, 109-110; Backhouse 
2002: 298-301; Stiglitz 2018: 75). 
Crucially for the fiscal policy discussion, the apparently technical and methodological 
changes to economic analysis, inspired by New Classical Economics entrenched ‘crowding 
out’ and Ricardian equivalence assumptions. In an RBC world of rational expectations, the 
representative agent, and complete, efficiently operating markets - government stabilisation 
policy has no role to play (see Romer 2012; Quiggin 2012: 96). Robert Solow calls these the 
‘Panglossian assumptions’ that underpin mainstream modern macroeconomics in the DSGE 
vein (2008: 243). As Best and Widmaier point out, New Classical economics makes a case 
against any kind of public intervention; ‘fiscal policy, - even discretionary monetary policy – 
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all were seen as inherently suspect. In a world of rational agents, the best thing that the state 
can do is to establish clear property laws and let the market sort things out’ (2006: 623). 
Bringing the normative theoretical moves and the methodological innovations together, the 
‘representative agent with rational expectations’ (RARE) emerged as the fulcrum of state of 
the art macroeconomics. The need for solid micro-foundations, and the merits of DSGE 
became a point of methodological commonality, shared by disparate approaches to 
macroeconomics from RBC to New Keynesianism. Whilst some accepted the unrealistic 
assumptions of the ‘complete markets paradigm’ inspired by New Classical economics 
(Buiter 2009), New Keynesian economists swiftly retreated from some of the extreme 
assumptions of efficient markets. They added frictions and incorporated wage and price 
rigidities and other market imperfections into their micro-founded models. This provided the 
methodological lynch-pin of the ‘New Consensus’ in macroeconomics which emerged in the 
late 1990s and 2000s (Arestis 2009; Woodford 2009). Incorporating these market 
imperfections both rendered the models more useable for real-world policy analysis, and 
rehabilitated a role for government economic policy in stabilisation (Skidelsky 2009: 31).  
Modelling Fiscal Policy Effects at the Fund Before and After the Crash 
There was a tendency for both New Keynesian and RBC models in the pre-crash period to 
often implicitly assume something approaching perfect competition and complete markets, 
although New Keynesians incorporated more market imperfections, and how far models went 
in this direction did vary (Buiter 2009; Wren-Lewis 2016). The Fund took very seriously the 
insights about rational expectations, as well as those about rigorous microfoundations. RBC 
theorising became part of the range of economic ideas evoked in Fund publications and RBC 
models formed the basis on which the Fund built up its DSGE modelling (see e.g. Batini et al 
2012: 7, 12-13; Blanchard 2018). Even before the GFC, the IMF modelling team was 
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recalibrating its DSGE modelling to incorporate a wider array of ‘New Keynesian’ market 
imperfections, revising their models to reduce the reliance on RBC and New Classical 
complete market and constant optimisation characteristics.  
The rationale behind the revisions was to improve the ability of Fund models to explain real-
world fiscal policy dynamics and effects (Botman et al 2006, 2007; Laxton 2008). IMF 
modellers, more than most academic economists, are keen to improve the fit between their 
data and their models, which can require ‘more flexible, less microfounded, lag structures’ 
(on this see Blanchard 2018: 48).7 The IMF developed a wider array of DSGE models, 
especially designed to address particular fiscal policy issues and effects. Regarding the IMF’s 
main ‘Global Economy Model’ (GEM) DSGE model, Fund modellers recognised that its 
representative agent ‘paradigm’ meant GEM was not useful for fiscal policy issues (Botman 
et al  2007: 1, 15; Laxton 2008). Fund discussions of GEM’s shortcomings noted it lacked 
‘the departures from Ricardian equivalence necessary for realistic analysis of fiscal issues’ 
(Botman et al  2007: 4).  
By 2006 the IMF had developed the Global Fiscal Model (GFM), designed specifically to 
contain features recognising a range of market imperfections in order to handle fiscal policy 
issues. The ‘Keynesian’ qualities of GFM are limited, since Botman et al (2007) make the 
case that fiscal consolidation is beneficial, even if there are negative short-run effects. 
Nevertheless the changed assumptive foundations of the model are significant. Crucially, this 
more fiscally-attuned IMF DSGE model disaggregated between ‘consumption of optimizing 
agents’ and ‘consumption by rule-of-thumb consumers’ (Botman et al 2006: 9). The 
inclusion of the latter meant this was a non-Ricardian model. It stood outside the New 
Classical conception of the economy. Fund modellers seeking to develop and recalibrate 
                                                          
7 Interview with Senior IMF modeller Doug Laxton, September 2013. 
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DSGE models were, however, attentive to retain their commitment to ‘rigorous 
microfoundations’ (Botman et al 2006: 3). IMF modellers framed their revisions using 
techniques that were most likely to convince within the economics profession and amongst 
their peers at the Fund.  
When the GFC hit, the limitations of standard, off the peg mainstream DSGE models for 
understanding the fiscal policy discussion became more keenly felt (see e.g. Krugman 2018). 
The crash presented a world that DSGE modelling underpinned by the optimising rational 
expectations of a representative agent struggled to explain or account for. A range of leading 
economists, including Krugman, Stiglitz, Mankiw and Solow raised questions about 
mainstream DSGE’s foundations. As Eatwell and Milgate put it tartly, ‘they note the patent 
absurdity of assuming that representative agent models can capture the complicated 
interactions of very many heterogeneous agents’ (2011: 15).  
The range of problems raised with DSGE after the crash is wide and deep (see e.g. Stiglitz 
2018), with Paul Romer arguing that DSGE models do not qualify as scientific work (2016). 
The specific focus here is on limitations pertinent to the fiscal policy discussion. The models 
did not accommodate, for example, involuntary unemployment, or banks and the financial 
sector, or default. A crucial limitation was the linearity of DSGE models, and their blindness 
to the economic cycle. A Keynesian-style multiplier varies according to the output gap, and is 
larger in recessions. This, as Parker notes, is ‘ruled out in the dynamics of any DSGE model 
linearized around a single point … in almost every DSGE model … fiscal policy is as 
effective in a roaring boom as a deep recession.’ (Parker 2011: 2).  
The IMF moved to revisit and recalibrate the foundations and application of its DSGE 
modelling, focusing on the RARE assumptive foundations, Ricardian equivalence, and the 
‘complete markets paradigm’ underpinning the whole edifice (see e.g. Buiter 2009; Solow 
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2008; Eatwell & Milgate 2011: xvi-xviii). Such models and such thinking were of limited use 
for the IMF in conducting its surveillance and policy recommendations amidst the GFC and 
the Great Recession. David Romer, the Berkeley Economist then working within the IMF 
Research Department, noted ‘the workhorse new Keynesian dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium (DSGE) models on which we were concentrating so much of our attention have 
been of minimal value in addressing the greatest macro-economic crisis in three quarters of a 
century’ (2012: 57). The impetus for revisiting the modelling techniques and assumptions 
(notably about fiscal policy inefficacy) underpinning DSGE modelling grew within the Fund 
(Blanchard 2014, Anderson et al 2013).  
Highlighting the Fund’s relative methodological pluralism, Blanchard noted in September 
2014, ‘the message should be to let a hundred flowers bloom. Now that we are more aware of 
nonlinearities [revealed by the financial crisis and its aftermath] and the dangers they pose, 
we should explore them further theoretically and empirically—and in all sorts of models’ 
(Blanchard 2014: 28). Whilst remaining committed to revise and improve DSGE models, 
Blanchard noted how the ‘current core’ of DSGE, ‘roughly an RBC structure with one main 
distortion, nominal rigidities’ was ‘too much at odds with reality to be the best starting point.’ 
More specifically, the understanding of the dynamics of consumption and price-setting (based 
around perfectly competitive markets), ‘in combination with rational expectations’ leads to 
assumptions of ‘too much forward-lookingness on the part of economic agents’ (2018: 52). 
The implications of these shortcomings for how the models assess macroeconomic and fiscal 
policy effects are crucially important. The recognition of more market imperfections, and 
greater impediments to markets clearing, points to a profoundly different conception of 
policy efficacy. Such insights about the limits of agents’ optimisation sparked off, both 
within the Fund and outside it, further rethinking of the agents who constituted the micro-
foundations of macroeconomic theorising. One thing the New Classical and RBC-inspired 
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representative agent approach fails to acknowledge is how different groups within the 
economy exhibit differing marginal propensities to consume (Stiglitz 2018: 84; Haldane & 
Turrell 2018: 231, 238). The move to incorporate heterogenous agents into the models is of 
particular relevance to the fiscal policy discussion. 
IMF work outlining the structure of their fiscal models had already noted a range of reasons 
why Ricardian Equivalence does not hold (Botman et al 2006: 3-4; Botman et al 2007; 
Laxton 2008).8 These views became more firmly held following the crash as Fund modellers 
redoubled their efforts to address the limitations of their pre-crisis models. Specifically, they 
further revisited and relaxed the unhelpful Ricardian and complete, efficient market 
assumptions on which earlier models had been based (see Laxton 2008, Botman et al 2007). 
The Fund goes beyond a standard New Classical ‘representative agent’ worldview to 
envisage a more differentiated economy, including cash-strapped households and ‘hand-to-
mouth’ consumers. The move in this direction began before the GFC (Botman et al 2006), 
but has been accelerated since (Anderson et al 2013). Crucially for understandings of fiscal 
policy efficacy, credit-constrained or ‘rule of thumb’ consumers are ‘non-Ricardian’, reacting 
differently to rises in public expenditure by fully consuming additional income. This 
technical alteration unpicks some of the intellectual moves made by the NCCR. Agent 
heterogeneity challenges Ricardian Equivalence and crowding out assumptions, and so 
resurrects the possibility of a positive impact of public intervention in the economy. The 
potency of counter-cyclical fiscal policy increases in models based on these assumptions. 
Fund flagship publications (IMF 2013: 17-21) point to how, in academic economics as well 
as at the Fund, Keynesian features have been brought into DSGE modelling (e.g., Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Woodford 2011). The Keynesian economists at Berkeley, 
                                                          
8 Interviews with Senior Fund modellers and economists, June & September 2013. 
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Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, oft-cited in Fund publications, note how the binding zero 
lower bound on interest rates means ‘increases in government spending’ have ‘no crowding 
out of investment or consumption, which leads to large multipliers’ that ‘in recessionary 
times’ could be ‘between 3 and 5’ (2012: 8). Thus the Fund’s somewhat Keynesian 
recalibration of its DSGE models finds succour from similar work by a group of respected 
economists. Within the Fund, the revisionist view of DSGE modelling predominated.  
 
IMF Post-Crash Modelling, Fiscal Efficacy, and the Economic Cycle 
 
The IMF’s post-crash models became more sophisticated, incorporating more rigidities and 
market imperfections highlighted by Keynesian and New Keynesian theory (Anderson et al 
2013). Yet as DSGE models they retained a number of in-built linear assumptions of a return 
to full employment (Parker 2011). The Fund’s Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal Model 
(GIMF), despite being specifically designed to address fiscal policy efficacy questions, faces 
limitations inherent in its design and structure. It is, after all, a general equilibrium model 
where all markets clear. As one Staff Discussion Note underlined, GIMF retains a crucial 
flaw ‘the model does not allow for involuntary unemployment and the analysis is conducted 
around an initial steady state that does not account for different cyclical or competitiveness 
positions’ (Barkbu et al 2012: 14-15; see also Riera-Crichton, Vegh & Vuletin 2014). 
Another Fund study of post-crash fiscal policy bemoaned the over-reliance in the literature on 
‘linearized dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models which by construction 
rule out state-dependent multipliers.’ (Batini et al 2012: 5; Corsetti, Meier & Muller 2012: 9; 
Auerbach & Gorodnichenko 2012: 2). State (of the economy)-dependent fiscal multipliers 
fall outside GIMF’s worldview.  
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In recognition of the limitations of DSGE’s linear, equilibriating assumptive foundations, 
IMF economists used other techniques alongside DSGE models to tackle post-crash fiscal 
policy issues. Some of these were better able to capture cycle-dependent fiscal multipliers 
and other aspects of fiscal policy efficacy in the extra-ordinary post-crash conditions. Using 
non-linear techniques emulating Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), IMF research found 
considerably higher multipliers during recessions (Batini et al 2012: 5). Similarly, the IMF’s 
Fiscal Monitor used a ‘a regime-switching VAR to control for differences in the impacts of 
fiscal shocks during periods of positive and negative output gaps and find multipliers of up to 
1.3 during downturns.’ (IMF 2012: xi, 15, 33-9; Batini et al 2012: 11). This important 
asymmetric multipliers finding was corroborated in a range of other IMF research avoiding 
linear approaches (see e.g. Corsetti, et al 2012: 2-5, 24-5; Baum et al 2012: 13, 17). 
The specific conditions presented by the crash raised the likelihood of what Keynesians 
called the ‘liquidity trap’ in advanced economies indicating both higher fiscal multipliers, and 
a reduced risk of crowding out effects. As Baum et al summarise the thinking, ‘In times of a 
negative output gap, the traditional crowding-out argument—that higher government 
spending displaces private spending—is generally less applicable since excess capacities are 
available in the economy. In addition, the proportion of credit-constrained households and 
firms, which adjust spending in response to a change in disposable income, is higher’ (Baum 
et al 2012:  5, 6). As post-GFC Fund research and other studies have consistently found that 
fiscal policy potency varies according to cycle, affecting both the size of fiscal multipliers 
and the likelihood of crowding out effects (IMF 2017b: 189-90), it is important not to always 
assume away the cycle in their thinking, for example through over-reliance on DSGE 
modelling.  
Since the crash, IMF advanced economy fiscal policy commentary thus places the findings 
from DSGE analysis in a wider, more cyclically attuned, context. DSGE models ‘suggest that 
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the size of multipliers tends to be modest (between zero and one over the first year) in 
“normal times” … in which the economy does not have a significant output gap’. However, 
outside normal times, and indeed outside the purview of DSGE modelling, the Fund 
appreciates that ‘multipliers can vary with the state of the business cycle (generally larger in a 
downturn than in an expansion, although the empirical evidence is not conclusive) or the 
degree of monetary accommodation (larger when monetary policy is unresponsive, such as at 
the effective lower bound)’ (IMF 2017b: 187-8). 
Another reason to limit the reliance on DSGE is their ability to capture non-linear economic 
policy dynamics which the Fund saw as increasing pertinent in the post-crash context (see 
Spilimbergo et al. 2008; Freedman et al. 2009: 3; Blanchard & Cottarelli 2008; Blanchard 
2011, 2014). The economy can get ‘stuck’ below potential output levels for a prolonged 
period, due to non-linear dynamics such as secular stagnation, hysteresis, or deflation 
(Decressin & Laxton 2009). Discussions of GIMF simulations of the 2009 global fiscal 
stimulus note ‘The 2009 stimulus, for example, was likely instrumental in averting a potential 
deflationary spiral and protracted period of exceedingly high unemployment, macroeconomic 
conditions that general equilibrium models such as the GIMF are not well suited to capture’ 
(IMF 2012b: 17-18). Non-linearities are notoriously difficult to accommodate within DSGE 
models. The same problems apply to capturing ‘bad debt equilibria’ flowing from doubts 
about fiscal sustainability, ‘vicious cycles of falling activity and rising debt ratios’ or indeed 
between sovereigns and banks adverse feedback loops (IMF 2012b: 12. 18-19). Integral to 
the rehabilitation of fiscal policy is the recognition and greater appreciation by Fund 
economists of non-linear fiscal policy and financial system dynamics. This underscores the 
importance both of the caveats attached to DSGE models (what they can and cannot explain), 





The IMF’s Contingent Keynesianism 
The IMF, then, revisited its fiscal policy premises and the assumptive foundations of some of 
its econometric models. The Fund’s resultant reassessment of short-term fiscal policy 
efficacy for advanced economies was an important move within the politics of austerity 
debate. The IMFs new fiscal policy prescriptions which followed from this rethink and 
remodelling jar with the Fund’s reputation for austerity and fiscal conservatism (see also Clift 
2018a). The IMF’s latest fiscal policy models contain more ‘New Keynesian’ characteristics 
and features, and a wider array of market imperfections than their predecessors. GIMF 
incorporates further important departures from the pure rational expectations, representative 
agent’ (RARE) assumptions of New Classical economics (Anderson et al 2013: 8-17). It 
includes non-Ricardian consumers, as well as incomplete asset markets and ‘frictions in the 
form of sticky prices and wages, real adjustment costs, liquidity-constrained households, 
along with finite-planning horizons of households’.  Each of these features, hard-wired into 
the assumptive foundations of the model, reflect how the GIMF model constitutes a much 
less ‘anti-Keynesian’ view of the economy than in earlier DSGE models. The policy 
corollaries of all these features ‘imply an important role for monetary and fiscal policy in 
economic stabilization.’ (Anderson et al 2013: 4; Barkbu et al 2012: 14-15). This is 
reinforced by the view, developed at the Fund since 2008 outside a DSGE framework, that 
fiscal multipliers are higher during recessions, and especially those following financial crises. 
The essence of the IMF’s post-crash fiscal policy understandings are captured in the 
assumptions of its GIMF model, the ‘non-Ricardian features of the model’, the ‘non-
neutrality in both spending-based and revenue-based fiscal measures’ and its central policy 
corollary that ‘fiscal policy can stimulate the level of economic activity in the short run’ 
(Anderson et al  2013: 5). Government interventions through monetary and fiscal policy have 
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real, potentially potent, effects on the economic growth and stability that are at the core of the 
Fund’s mandate. A consistent feature of post-crash fiscal policy recommendations for 
advanced economies are targeted social transfers to benefit lower earners and poor and 
vulnerable social groups with a higher propensity to spend, and thus where the multipliers are 
higher, especially when the output gap is large (Freedman et al 2009: 7-9; IMF 2008: 181) 
than other transfers (see also IMF 2009: xiii-xiv, 26, 42-3; IMF 2016, p 12-14; IMF 2017a: 
x). This focus on lower earners continues in the vein of heterogeneous and liquidity-
constrained agents, illustrating how the model tweaks and the policy recommendation 
‘outputs’ link together. 
A further indication of the Keynesian flavour of the rehabilitation of fiscal policy within the 
IMF, reflected in the assumptive foundations of the new GIMF model, is greater recognition 
of the positive impact of government investment on the long run productivity of the 
economy. Thus ‘a temporary increase in government investment will raise the economy’s 
productive capacity for many years to come’ (Anderson et al 2013: 10; see also Kumhof et al 
2010). This has become a recurrent IMF clarion call; in the current low interest rate context, 
such measures will pay for themselves and indeed bring down debt through their positive 
growth effects (IMF 2014b: ch 3, IMF 2015: xi; IMF 2016: 12-14; IMF 2017a: x, 2-3, 17-
20). 
 
The crash heightened awareness within the Fund of the adverse pro-cyclical propensities of 
financial markets, and their potential impacts on demand, confidence and the real economy. 
The IMF has been mindful of the need to incorporate them into DSGE modelling, 
recognising this was a shortcoming of its earlier DSGE models (Laxton 2008: 239). Moves to 
incorporate the financial / real sector interactions into IMF models progressed with GIMF. 
Addressing these ‘macro- financial linkages’ in the post-crash GIMF model is achieved 
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through the incorporation of ‘a financial accelerator’ (Kumhof et al  2010: 4) which 
recognises the pro-cyclical dynamics of the financial system (Anderson et al  2013: 5, 7). The 
potentially deleterious pro-cyclical effect on demand and confidence of these financial / real 
sector interactions is another facet of the case for heightened potency of counter-cyclical 
fiscal policy.  
 
Summing up the Fund’s post-crash views on advanced economy fiscal policy, the April 2017 
Fiscal Monitor noted, ‘The greater role of fiscal policy for stabilization has also been 
supported by academic research showing that discretionary fiscal policy can have a strong 
effect on output (reflected in high fiscal multipliers) when monetary policy is constrained, the 
financial sector is weak, and there is significant and protracted slack in the economy’ (IMF 
2017a: ix-x, 1-2). Important though it is, this is a context-specific and thus contingent 
revision of the IMF’s fiscal policy thinking. It applies to advanced economies and in the 
context of the post-GFC recessionary conditions.  
Crucially, monetary policy, normally the preferred economic stabilisation tool, had reached 
its ‘zero lower bound’. The interaction of fiscal and monetary policy affected fiscal policy 
efficacy. Fiscal multipliers, the Fund’s post-crash modelling indicated, were considerably 
higher when there is monetary accommodation, as in the case of sustained very low interest 
rates (Anderson et al 2013: 17). Fund flagships recurrently noted how, under conditions of 
low interest rates and where the economy was operating below full employment, crowding 
out was much less likely (IMF 2017b: 185-7) 
This ‘special case’ argument had the merit of down-playing any disjuncture with pre-GFC 
Fund pronouncements on fiscal policy, or indeed fiscal policy views articulated about other 
kinds of countries. It also opened up scope for Fund staff to consider a more positive attitude 
towards counter-cyclical fiscal activism without dislodging baseline predispositions- under 
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normal conditions to prioritise long-term fiscal sustainability. The post-crash IMF became 
more positive about the short-term potency of fiscal policy as a counter-cyclical tool. Yet the 
Fund has not lost its reservations about deficit bias and expansionary fiscal policy, described 
variously by insiders as ‘innate’ and ‘congenital’. Reluctance to advocate increasing public 
expenditure  due to concerns of long-term fiscal sustainability has always been an element of 
its views on sound fiscal policy (see e.g. Heller 2002, 2005; Kumar & Ter-Minassian 2007).  
 
These pre-dispositions influence the way the Fund advises countries to engage in stabilisation 
using counter-cyclical fiscal policy.  There is a preference for expenditure reductions rather 
than revenue increases to address fiscal adjustment problems (see Baum et al 2012: 17-18). 
Fiscal sustainability is seen as a ‘crucial precondition’ of finding higher fiscal multipliers at 
times of financial crisis, the policy implications being  ‘This clearly underscores the case for 
preserving and strengthening fiscal buffers in good times’ (Corsetti, Meier & Muller 2012: 
24-5), since one can never predict accurately when a financial crisis may hit.  
 
The long-term properties of GIMF assume that ‘sustained government deficits crowd out 
private investment and net foreign assets in the long run.’ (Anderson et al 2013: 5). Ricardian 
equivalence does not hold in the short-term, but in the long-term crowding out is anticipated. 
The two positions are reconciled through a disjuncture between the short-term and long-term 
premises of its GIMF model. This is a post-crash refresh of the amalgamation of short-term 
Keynesian, long-term neo-classical view, a take on the neo-classical synthesis which has long 
found favour within the Fund (see Chwieroth 2010).9 It indicates that under the specific post 
–crash conditions fiscal policy is more effective, whilst retaining Fund concerns about fiscal 
                                                          
9 Endorsement of the view was a feature of numerous interviews with IMF economists, including Olivier 
Blanchard, David Lipton, and Paolo Mauro.   
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The IMF undertook a significant yet contingent re-assessment of fiscal policy – applying to 
advanced economies, specifically those enjoying ‘fiscal space’, and under the particular post-
GFC macroeconomic conditions. Nevertheless, this constitutes meaningful change, and in 
recognition of that this article offers four main contributions to nuance our understanding of 
the IMF and its economic ideas. Firstly, to the specific literature on IMF economic ideas, we 
find evidence of gradual but significant ideational change. In the early to mid 2000s, IMF 
modellers found that the Ricardian assumptions arising out of New Classical Economics did 
not prove helpful in modelling real world fiscal policy outcomes. The Fund began altering its 
model assumptions to admit more Keynesian insights, developing new non-Ricardian fiscal 
policy models. The IMF’s fiscal modelling revisions, which began before the crash, 
accelerated after it as Fund economists developed more New Keynesian conceptions of 
rational expectations and revised its models further. Thus we find the Keynesian revival at 
the Fund being both longer in germination and more enduring than some have recognised. 
Our analysis also underlines the range of economic ideas on which the IMF are ready to draw 
is, perhaps, wider than commonly understood. The range of operational ideas informing Fund 
thinking and practice extends from New Classical and RBC to ‘New Keynesian’ and indeed 
‘Keynesian’ economic thinking. This variety of economic insights, often with vastly differing 
policy implications and corollaries, remains in play within the Fund and reconcilable to the 
relatively broad church of New Consensus macroeconomics. 
Secondly, the article adds to a body of ideational scholarship questioning the stability, 
consistency and coherence of thinking suggested by the paradigm framework by highlighting 
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limitations of a paradigm change framework for understanding the post-crash evolution of 
IMF fiscal policy thinking. The coexistence within IMF operational work of different ways of 
thinking about the economy has been underlined. We have identified a malleable, flexible 
approach to the evolution of the Fund’s fiscal policy thinking which has sought to incorporate 
ideas from different paradigms - notably radically incommensurable Keynesian and New 
Classical understandings of the economy - in a pragmatic amalgam according to policy 
context. Pushback against some of the anti-Keynesian assumptions associated with a New 
Classical world-view in the wake of the GFC generated much more favourable assessments 
of fiscal policy potency and efficacy. IMF economists see themselves as ‘pragmatic’ and 
‘non-doctrinaire’ ‘clinical’ economists, ready to take a theory of the economy off the peg 
when it looks germane to the economic policy discussion at hand. Whilst this self-image jars 
with assessments of earlier IMF ‘groupthink’ and ‘intellectual capture’, and fails to recognise 
the ideological character of all economic ideas, it is consistent with the Fund’s anachronistic 
‘inter-paradigm’ borrowing detailed here. 
Thirdly, we add to the politics of economic ideas approach a greater focus on economic 
method and technique. Modelling assumptions have been identified as an important site of 
contestation over between New Classical and New Keynesian views of the economy and 
policy. There was increased awareness at the Fund of the limitations of DSGE models, 
notably their inability to capture higher fiscal multipliers during a recession. Openness to 
different kinds of models was championed from on high by the Chief economist (Blanchard 
2014: 28). The IMF’s small modelling team have re-thought the micro-foundations of the 
models, and other analytical techniques in a more Keynesian-compatible way. An important 
aspect of this was IMF economists thinking outside the DSGE box, using non-linear 
analytical techniques to incorporate the rediscovery of some older (Keynesian) assumptions 
about economic policy. A key specific shift in Fund fiscal policy thinking is greater 
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recognition of more Keynesian insights about the size of fiscal multipliers depending on the 
state of the economy (higher in a recession following a financial crisis). Such an insights 
cannot be captured with DSGE modelling which ‘rule out’ such state (of the economy) 
dependent multipliers ‘by construction’ (Batini et al 2012: 5; Corsetti, Meier & Muller 2012: 
9). Thus this important revision required the use of non-linear methods. Drilling down into 
models and their assumptions in this way enables close inspection of how the IMF have 
incrementally moved the goalposts economic policy rectitude.  
Fourthly, in relation to the politics of austerity, we have laid bare some of the underpinnings 
of the Fund’s key interventions within international economic policy debates, wherein the 
IMF was central to bolstering the respectability of the positive views of fiscal policy’s 
efficacy for a particular group of countries under specific conditions. There was, within the 
assumptive foundations of post-crash Fund modelling, a clear rejection of the New Classical 
and RBC assertions that public intervention in the economy always does more harm than 
good. This had significant implications for the international economic policy debate about 
policies being pursued amidst the Great Recession. Fund post-crash fiscal policy modelling 
and analysis increased the confidence with which the Fund threw its weight behind its 
decisive debunking of the expansionary fiscal contraction thesis (IMF 2010), underpinned 
and reinforced its assessment of higher fiscal multipliers in the post-crash context (IMF 
2012b), and reinforced its more positive view of public infrastructure investment (IMF 
2014b). In this way these apparently technical recalibrations of Fund methods and models 
hard-wired a more positive assessment of fiscal policy potency into Fund thinking, and were 
an important intervention in the politics of austerity. Analysing how the politics of economic 
ideas plays out in this level of granular detail demonstrates how modelling revisions and 
analytical techniques bolstered the IMF’s contingent Keynesian post-crash fiscal policy 
assessment for advanced economies. Rethinking the micro-foundations of IMF models 
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